Comcast DEFA 14A 5-18-05
UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
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A
SPECIAL MESSAGE FROM
COMCAST
CORPORATION TO ITS SHAREHOLDERS
In
advance of our Annual Meeting of Shareholders on June 1, 2005, we want to take
this opportunity to highlight the steps that Comcast has taken and the progress
we have made to improve our corporate governance.
While
all the issues at the Annual Meeting are significant, there are several that
merit special mention. You recently received a letter from the CWA and IBEW
urging you to support shareholder proposals 5, 6 and 7 - to require that the
Chairman of the Board not have managerial responsibilities, to eliminate our
shareholder rights plan unless shareholder approval is received, and to adopt a
recapitalization plan. We urge you to continue to support the Board and
management team and ask for your votes in favor of all director nominees and
against all four shareholder proposals.
Comcast
Continues to Improve Its Corporate Governance
Addition
of two Independent Directors to the Board
After
our Annual Meeting, if all of the Company’s director nominees are elected,
Comcast will have a two-thirds independent board as defined by applicable
governance standards (eight independent directors out of twelve directors). Each
member of the Audit Committee, Compensation Committee and Governance and
Directors Nominating Committee is independent as defined under NASDAQ
rules.
This
year, we are taking steps to increase the number of independent Board members
with the addition of Joseph J. Collins and Edward D. Breen to our Board. Both
directors bring significant experience and insight to Comcast. From 1989 to
2001, Mr. Collins served as Chairman and CEO of Time Warner Cable. Subsequent to
that, he was CEO of AOL Time Warner Interactive Video from 2001 to 2003. Mr.
Breen has been Chairman and CEO of Tyco International, Ltd. since July
2002. From
January 2002 to July 2002 he was President and CEO of Motorola, Inc., and prior
to that, from January 2001 to January 2002 he was Executive Vice President and
President of Motorola's Networks Sector.
Existing
Corporate Governance Is Strong
Prior
Year Board Support from ISS
Last
year, focus was placed on certain Board members. The AFL-CIO urged withhold
votes on two directors on a variety of grounds.
Last
year, ISS recommended voting FOR all
of our directors. All of our directors were overwhelmingly re-elected, with at
least 92 percent of the votes cast. We urge your support for all of our director
nominees again this year.
Comcast
and Its Shareholders Benefit from Having Brian Roberts As Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer
The
Board believes that Comcast and its shareholders are best served by having Brian
Roberts serve as Chairman and CEO because he is the most qualified and
appropriate individual to lead the Board as Chairman. The Board also believes
that Board independence and oversight of management are effectively maintained
through the Board's current composition, Committee system and composition and
policy of having regular private sessions of only independent, non-employee
directors that are led by our Presiding Director. Furthermore, having one
individual perform the role of Chairman and CEO is both consistent with the
practice of many major companies and not restricted or prohibited by current
laws (including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and recently promulgated SEC
regulations). IRRC's 2004 Board Practices/Board Pay study found that 70 percent
of companies within the S&P 1,500 index do not separate the positions of
Chairman and CEO.
Importance
of Shareholder Rights Plan
Comcast’s
shareholder rights plan was adopted by our Board of Directors in accordance with
Pennsylvania law. The rights plan protects Comcast’s shareholders by requiring a
potential acquirer to negotiate in good faith with the Board, as opposed to
employing coercive takeover tactics. This enables the Board to negotiate a more
favorable transaction that is fair to shareholders.
The
rights plan strengthens the ability of the Board to fulfill its fiduciary duties
under Pennsylvania law and to obtain higher value for Comcast’s shareholders.
Comcast’s Board is not alone in its determination of the value of shareholder
rights plans. Approximately 2,000 other U.S. corporations have adopted a rights
plan, virtually all without shareholder approval, and over 50% of the S&P
500 companies also have such plans.
The
benefits to shareholders of a rights plan have also been validated by empirical
data, which suggests that premiums paid to acquire target companies with rights
plans are higher than premiums paid for target companies that do not have rights
plans. For example, a 1997 Georgeson & Company study of takeover premiums
during the period from 1992 to 1996 estimated that premiums paid to acquire
target companies with rights plans were, on average, 8% higher than premiums
paid for target companies that did not have rights plans. The Georgeson &
Company study concluded that the presence of a rights plan did not increase the
likelihood of the defeat of a hostile takeover bid or the withdrawal of a
friendly bid, nor did rights plans reduce the likelihood that a company would
become a takeover target; the takeover rate was similar for companies with and
without rights plans. The same study also concluded that companies with rights
plans received higher premiums regardless of whether the takeover was friendly
or hostile.
Comcast’s
Dual Class Voting Stock Has Not Impaired Shareholder Value
The
dual class structure for Comcast stock has existed since 1972 when Comcast went
public and has contributed to Comcast’s stability and long-term shareholder
returns. The dual class is common in the media industry and can be found in such
outstanding companies as Viacom, The New York Times and The Washington Post.
It is
also important to note that there has been a recent significant change with
respect to the dual class voting structure that has been a hallmark of Comcast’s
capital structure for more than three decades. Before Comcast’s acquisition of
AT&T Broadband in November 2002, Brian Roberts beneficially owned Comcast
stock representing approximately 87% of the combined voting power of all Comcast
stock. In connection with that transaction - which was approved overwhelmingly
by AT&T and Comcast shareholders - Mr. Roberts agreed to reduce his voting
interest to a 33 1/3% nondilutable interest. Without this concession, the
AT&T Broadband transaction, which has proved so beneficial to Comcast and
its shareholders, would not have been possible. We expect to maintain this
voting structure and do not believe that it represents any impairment to the
interests of our shareholders.
We
believe that the historical success of Comcast is owed in large part to the
respected and stable leadership provided by Mr. Roberts and before him by the
leadership provided by the Company’s founder and previous Chairman, Ralph J.
Roberts. Through their leadership and focus on long-term growth, Comcast has a
proven track record for creating shareholder value. Comcast shares have
outperformed leading stock indices by significant margins, including the S&P
500 by a margin of approximately 2 to 1 since Comcast went public in 1972.
Conclusion
Comcast
takes very seriously the need for strong corporate governance. We urge you to
continue to support the Board and management team and ask for your votes in
favor of all director nominees and against all shareholder proposals.
Arthur
R. Block
Secretary